Over at D5GW, I recently left a short post criticizing Thomas Barnett's take on "info-war." I should know, and did know, that such a simple reference and comment would leave a great deal unsaid. The topic is big; the system of intellectual loyalty that sometimes pervades our corner of the Blogosphere would surely produce more questions than were addressed in the one sentence, perhaps even a little intellectual blowback.

Tonight, while reviewing stat logs for my blog Phatic Communion, I noticed a visit to PC's version of a post cross-posted to D5GW and, for my own peculiar reasons, I followed the link to that older version. I'm extremely iterative, more of the compulsive rather than the obsessive (simply because I'm also not very prone to systemic organization and strict routine, with some exceptions), and I'm always constantly reviewing my own posts, comments, site designs (you may have noticed...), etc. When I saw the link in my stat logs, I thought, "Hmmm..." and clicked through.

I'm glad I did. Many of the older 5GW-related posts that originally appeared on PC have comments which I did not transfer, comments easily forgotten or lost in the static. (I did not transfer the comments because I thought the commenters, by commenting where they did, agreed to have their comments appear there; who was I to re-broadcast them elsewhere?) One of my own comments under that thread, the last comment in the thread, neatly ties into the consideration of my criticism of Barnett:

CGW wrote:

It is difficult to believe that any organization could achieve predetermined goals by the methods mentioned above; plus, the idea of war as physics-centric -- weapons-centric -- is a darling of strategists, a historical model that will be difficult to shed.

In his post, Barnett comments:

Thomas P. M. Barnett wrote:

Okay, but why call it war? Because we like calling everything war. Keeps you scared. Keeps experts in the money. But here's the key difference: attack me for real and there's real damage. Attack me virtually and I'm forced into better security and resilience.

The funny thing, which I hadn't thought of before but only now as I re-read that (that is, as I iterate) is this: The more "concrete" type of war, with bombs and guns and so forth, also forces us "into better security and resilience!"

The post on PC under which I commented, "Initiating 5GW," included an early exploration of how 5GW operators might operate. Its focus: the creation of memes, perhaps also by utilizing high-K attacks, that would force other actors to act in predetermined ways. The multifarious, numerous activities of these other actors, within many domains, would ultimately produce a system "designed" by the 5GW operators. So my comment there acknowledged the fact that many would view such a 5GW operational method as being fantastical, perhaps impossible. In an earlier part of the comment, leading up to the above, I said that such a view is exactly the point:

CGW wrote:

The general idea itself presents problems which, I think, may make it seem slightly fanciful or wishy-washy -- but then, that is part of its strength, for a 5GWarrior.

I.e., no one will be able to believe it is really happening. Info-war, for example, can be defined in terms of the past -- Look, Ma, no blood! -- and dismissed. If the attacks that come in the form of info-war are thought to have as their purpose the normal warish effects, then not only the absence of blood but also the turning away of massive concrete collateral damage will lead the victim to believe all is well. That some other objective may have been intended is beside the point.

Such was my criticism (generally speaking) later in the D5GW thread, in response to Shane's defense of Barnett. The subject has been rearing its head in various posts on D5GW, most particularly in a post Dan published on "Kinetics and Violence."

We are prone to draw lines and conceive of reality in a linear fashion. I put a knife through your heart, that is violence and quite kinetic; I whisper lies into your lover's ear about you, that's pretty low-K, but his knife, held in his own hand, piercing your heart is high-K. I program coordinates into a missile system that will direct the missile to your bridge: low-K. The bridge blowing up when the missile hits it: high-K. The suicide bomber gets massacred when he destroys your bridge: high-K. But driving the vehicle to that bridge is much lower-K. If we can connect the dots directly between cause and effect, we are prone to believe we are seeing violence; if we see a knife or bomb-laden vehicle tying the person to the object he would destroy, we are prone to see high-K.

I mentioned in response to Shane that Barnett has shamed his own vision. Capitalism and trade have greatly distanced the cause from the effect -- for instance, the person working the assembly line is far from the person who would use the product, much farther from the person who paid that consumer a wage enabling that consumer to buy it -- and so Barnett's vision relies on the dispersal of sources and indirect kinetics. The overall effect might be a lesser dependence on direct lines, bombs and guns, for solving large disputes, especially since the production of high-tech weaponry depends upon having a production cast larger than that of even the most well-financed big-budgeted movies. One must be very careful when acting directly, linearly, to change the system, due to these interdependencies. Conflict resolution becomes a complex negotiation, not only between many persons (even a democracy's polity, entire!) but also between each of these persons and the concrete environment supporting their activities.

Concrete and abstract, the OODA: Nonetheless, each person is prone to draw a straight line, whether when acting or when intellectualizing. 5GWers will depend upon this reality. The indirect attack itself may not be the attack; the weapon may not be code, but the minds of those interpreting the code, reacting to it, playing with it. The OODA being the OODA, information does not remain "virtual." A comes after O.

There is no such thing as a non-kinetic effect.

D5GW contributor Dan tdaxp recently left a comment on D5GW,

Dan tdaxp wrote:

This is a valuable post. proto-5GW should be discovered and referenced -- it increases the credibility of online 5GW researchers and makes it even harder for any johnny-come-lately to steal credit.

on PurpleSlog's post, "Old 5GW Reference: But Is it 5GW?"

The dynamic interplay between the post and the comment seems filled with meaning, as each is.

As 5GW develops, who can know exactly where it will lead? Naturally, this is a subject I've pondered quite a bit. Dan frequently links his old blog posts which, admittedly, were very strong foundations for my own thoughts; this self-linking (which I've already done in this post!) is a type of effort to establish originality or, more to the point, sources of originality; and I've also lately rather bluntly attacked the subject of 5GW and originality.

Mark Safranski and Col. Hammes have each suggested that 4GW may be 70 years old already, 5GW underway for some time; in which case, we are all Johnnies-come-lately.

On the one hand, I also feel a frustration with particularly new and seemingly idiosyncratic permutations their authors would label "5GW." This first occurred with John Robb, who seemed to take the growing Internet discussion of 5GW and back-apply the term to a theory he had already spent much time developing. More recently, an article by Adam Katz published at the New English Review, "A Calculus of Covenants; or, Fifth Generation Warfare," has seemed to be a wholly insular creation, with nary a link or comment addressing the widespread and widening discussion of 5GW around the 'Sphere.

On the other hand, I suppose this is how 5GW will develop. Actually, 5GW might not develop entirely in the back room of Blogospheric intellectual debate and insular self-publication; perhaps 5GW will happen when it happens, and the Blogospheric development acts as merely a reflection of the interpersonal and individual development that will occur on the field among those who do 5GW.

Johnny-come-lately may be the one who actually ties aspects of these largely-extraneous threads into his own personal understanding of the battlefield and succeeds in operationalizing 5GW -- or who, never once reading the Blogospheric ejaculations, develops 5GW battle plans on his own through a deep understanding of the environment in which he operates.

Nonetheless, I must agree with Dan, at least as his thoughts apply to those of us who are virtual 5GW strategists: an entirely insular and largely abstract development process will not produce the results we desire. Only insofar as we are willing to give up claims to originality and allow the open-source development of 5GW the ability to inspire real innovation, is there any hope that these abstract permutations may approach some semblance of reality.

As a system of thought, the XGW framework is very young. "Into the 4th Generation," the famous Marine Corps Gazette article that employed the XGW framework was published in 1989. Since then, we've seen a shockingly vast array of published material, both in print and online, that discuss variants of the original XGW framework. However, we lack a truly comprehensive medium for a beginner to absorb the theory. The blizzard of published material and online writings on the subject that explicitly reference the XGW framework is daunting, especially to one who lacks the theoretical prerequisites necessary for understanding and interpreting it.

Adding to the problem is that the only book-length explanation of XGW theory, T.X. Hammes' The Sling and the Stone is not a useful guide to the beginner, as its "evolved insurgency" framework is an interpretation divergent from the totality of XGW thought and does not cover 5GW. Similarly, John Robb's Brave New War, while an accurate introduction to the XGW theory and its prerequisites, is not a true survey text (or for our purpose, textbook), because it does not cover the totality of XGW and advances the "Global Guerrillas" variant.

XGW information overload and the corresponding lack of a one-stop resource reference covering all branches of XGW thought acts as an impediment to the advancement of XGW beyond the small circle of military analysts and bloggers versed in the theory, and leads to misunderstandings whenever those unfamiliar with it engage with it. Given that an open-source model has already led to fruitful discussion advancing XGW theory online, we can speed the perfection of XGW theory by spreading it to as large of an audience as possible.

Sometime in the future it may be necessary to set up a wiki similar to MountainRunner's ConflictWiki, with a (constantly evolving) database covering the figures, theories, and events behind the XGW framework. Perhaps it could be hosted on Dreaming 5GW, or act as another site entirely. This will allow the beginner to contextualize the various threads and sub-theories that have developed over the last 13 years and confidently develop his/her own interpretation s. A good step towards this was Zenpundit's "Cutting Edge Military Theory" seminar on ChicagoBoyz. I notice that D5GW has links to white papers and resources on 5GW in the 5GW forums, but what is still needed is a Wikipedia-style interface that explains and contextualizes that information for the beginner.

Another problem is the lack of empirical and historical context in discussion of XGW. This is understandable, given that most of the discussion takes the form of blog posts. While online discussions provide feedback and a means of communication towards reaching a greater understanding, we might do well to copy the model of the Small Wars Journal. Peer-reviewed, journal-length social science articles may provide the kind of empirical weight and broad historical longview lacking from blogging. It would allow us to develop detailed case studies of XGW models applied to the real world and empirical surveys of those models. This journal (Journal of XGW Studies?) could be published as a PDF on the Wiki around once a year.

Despite these shortcomings, there is much to be proud of. As tdaxp writes,

Quote:

The blogosphere has been incredibly kind to 5GW theory -- perhaps the greatest burst of work on the "generations of warfare" framework since 4GW theory was introduced more than a decade ago.

This is a response to PurpleSlog's post on the master figure(s) he believes will be behind future conflict.

As I understand it, Purpleslog is suggesting is a master actor that will operate behind the scenes, manipulating various insurgent/terrorist/mercenary groups, some of them of his own creation. These manipulations, usually small in nature, culminate in the gradual achievement of a given goal. The puppetmaster will be hidden behind layer of dummy organizations and deception. As mentioned before, some of those front organizations will be set up by him to act in a false-flag capacity, staffed by either trained agents or unwilling dupes. In essence, (as Purpleslog notes), this is the classic conspiracy theory set up.

It also reminds me of one of my favorite anime series, Ghost in the Shell. Now that I've been given the excuse to go ahead with the sci-fi post that I've been wanting to do for a while, I think this will be long.

Ghost in the Shell, which came out in 1994 (although there was a brilliant sequel in 2004 and a rather so-so TV series airing on Cartoon Network right now), takes place in dystopian future very similar to that of Snow Crash and Blade Runner. All human beings and robots are connected to a network through their "ghosts," which as the Wikipedia entry puts it:

Quote:

"In Ghost in the Shell, the word ghost is colloquial slang for an individual's consciousness. In the manga's futuristic society, science has redefined the ghost as the thing that differentiates a human being from a biological robot. Regardless of how much biological material is replaced with electronic or mechanical substitutes, as long as an individual retains their ghost, they retain their humanity and individuality. The concept of the ghost was borrowed by [Ghost in the Shell creator] Masamune Shirow from an essay on structuralism, "The Ghost in the Machine" by Arthur Koestler. The title The Ghost in the Machine itself was originally used by an English philosopher, Gilbert Ryle to mock the paradox of conventional Cartesian dualism and Dualism in general. Koestler, like Ryle, denies Cartesian dualism and locates the origin of human mind in the physical condition of the brain. He argues that the human brain has grown and built upon earlier, more primitive brain structures, the "ghost in the machine", which at times overpower higher logical functions, and are responsible for hate, anger and other such destructive impulses. Shirow denies dualism similarly in his work, but defines the "ghost" more broadly, not only as a physical trait, but as a phase or phenomenon that appears in a system at a certain level of complexity. The brain itself is only part of the whole neural network; if, for example, an organ is removed from a body, the autonomic nerve of the organ and consequently its "ghost" will vanish unless the stimulus of the existence of the organ is perfectly re-produced by a mechanical substitution (this isn't necessarily true, think of pain in phantom limbs). This can be compared, by analogy, to a person born with innate deafness being unable to understand the concept of "hearing" unless taught. Ghost-dubbing, or duplicating a ghost, is currently an impossibility in the Ghost in the Shell universe. When performed, as a cheap AI substitute in [the sequel] and earlier in the [original] manga, the result is always inferior to the original-which always dies in the process. ... Cyberbrain warfare is the practice of employing ghost hacking as a means of gaining access to an opponent's cyberbrain, and ultimately, their ghost. A successful cyberhacker can intercept, censor, or augment the sensory information being received by a victim, or even go so far as to destroy or rewrite complete memories. Furthermore, a person's cyberbrain can be directly injured, by making the cyberbrain undergo unaffordable computation and thus overheat. (See Cordwainer Smith's "The Burning of the Brain") Cyberbrain warfare is portrayed as a natural consequence of the integration of cybernetic and wireless communication technology directly into the human brain. Despite the apparent risks, even the most paranoid characters in the story find the benefits of directly networking their brains to be indispensable. Apparently, any conduit by which information is absorbed by the brain can be exploited for ghost hacking. Shirow envisions the use of firewalls for protecting the ghost against attack, and multiple layers of encryption."

As the Wikipedia entry states , the "ghost" differentiates humans and machines, as in the future world cybernetic implants have become extensive. The villain in Ghost in the Shell is a figure called "The Puppetmaster," who hacks into "ghosts" and manipulates individuals to carry out terrorist actions for him. For example, a garbageman's "ghost" is hacked and he is manipulated into believing that he has an ex-wife (who he is engaged in a bitter custody battle with) and children. He meets a man at a bar who gives him "ghost-hacking" software, ostensibly for the purpose of getting back at his wife. However, the garbageman in fact is being used as a conduit by the Puppetmaster to hack the brain of a high-ranking minister. The garbageman is being used as a proxy to ensure that the "Puppetmaster" is not caught, as the signal is traced back the garbageman's network access terminal.

The Puppetmaster uses other individuals as puppets to hack the brains of important officials and carry out terrorist attacks. Each time, the puppet is caught, without anything that can implicate or suggest the identity of the mastermind behind it. As it turns out, the Puppetmaster himself is a strong AI program designed by an internal security agency to do corporate espionage and wetworks. When it gained self-awareness by accident, it turned against its creators.

Of course, this scenario is in a highly futuristic sci-fi universe that has little relationship to our own. But it does illuminate the weakness of highly organized and networked systems to one clever actor. For instance, read this Wired Magazine story about a cyberstalker who targeted a popular rock star:

Quote:

"The stalking started after [hacker Devon Townsend] saw [Linkin Park singer Chester Bennington]'s email address inadvertently CC'd in a mass mailing to promote a tattoo parlor he owned in Tempe. Using Chester's birthday and zip code to access his Mac.com account, she started guessing passwords until she found the right one: his middle name, Charlie. Townsend suddenly had access to all of her idol's messages. Soon she had [Bennington's wife Talinda's] Yahoo address, too, and after guessing the password, she reset it. From there, her infiltration was a feat of feverish social engineering. As Townsend pored through the Benningtons' email, she began cataloging every detail of their lives: friends, Social Security numbers, photos, plans. Getting Chester's cell phone data was a snap: All she'd needed was his wireless number, his zip code, and the last four digits of his Social Security number to register his Verizon account online and get complete access to records of his calls. Even Townsend herself seemed astonished at how easy it was. When she opened the Verizon account, the user ID she chose was 'ohshititworked.' Townsend told [investigators] she loved Linkin Park, particularly Chester. She said she wanted to be 'part of what he is.' In some of her emails, Townsend had told the Benningtons that she was trying to shield them from any bad information or emails that may be coming their way. It was classic stalker behavior — introducing duress, then pretending to relieve it in an attempt to appear useful."

In a way, the "Puppet Master" was employing a futuristic version of what Townsend did--manipulated an open network system through a series of proxies, although the difference is that Townsend's proxies were mechanized and the "Puppet Master's" proxies were real human beings.

I do see a possibility of what PurpleSlog is outlining. An individual, given enough resources, could conduct operations behind a wall of deception and misinformation. False-flag attacks, dummy organizations, misinformation, proxies, and information war capabilities could create enough confusion to allow a disciplined actor to decisively shape world events.

However, I see it as very rare--the entry costs to such an effort could only be met by someone extremely wealthy, with an almost supernatural level of intelligence. I suppose it would work best for a state security agency.

The stealth aspect of it would not suit most guerrillas and terrorists. Driven by nationalism and religion, they wage a public war directed towards various audiences. While deception is part of this game, I don't think the leader of a group like Al Qaeda would stand to sulk in the shadows, especially given that such groups derive political capital from the symbolism and charisma of their "emirs." Still, it is a danger, especially as we move closer and closer to the world envisioned in Ghost in the Shell.

Crossposted to Simulated Laughter

Arherring has a new post up on D5GW critiquing the 5GW prognostications of Colonel Thomas X. Hammes. I agree with every point Arherring made and added another related criticism in the comments.

Essentially:

1. Although Col. Hammes delineates the scope of 4GW very well (albeit, not as well as he should; re: Arherring's post) and announces "our" need to reorganize defenses in order to combat 4GW-style opponents, he does so through a state-centric p.o.v. One may wonder whether any nation-state in our modern world can possibly combat 4GW, given the fact that 4GW specializes in defeating nation-states. This goes beyond an US vs Them consideration and straight to the Centralized Force vs Decentralized Force dynamic that exists beyond/before a simple US vs Them paradigm. Simply understanding and recognizing 4GW -- the very point of Hammes' The Sling and The Stone -- is not enough to ensure the viability of a nation-state's winning conflicts with 4GW opponents.


2. In any case, given for the moment the possibility that nation-states can reorganize to successfully defeat proficient 4GW forces, Hammes' reliance on the use of advanced biotech weaponry (and other advanced technology) for defining 5GW seemed to me to follow a "bigger cannon" philosophy: If we, or they, build a bigger cannon, the bigger cannon will allow more destruction -- and, more efficiently find the targets -- and therefore allow victory. Arherring does a very good job of critiquing this point of view, especially when he asks, "How do you send an anthrax-laced letter to the 4GW al-Qaeda organization?"


3. Hammes seemed to have overlooked the fact that emerging technology and emerging social structures are far more than merely weaponized facets of our global system. I commented in the thread that Hammes has weaponized the Internet; I meant, that he (like many other warfare theorists) continues to look through a 3GW (or pre-4GW) lens which distorts theories of warfare by severely limiting the environment. In the past, relatively limited environments went hand-in-hand with warfare operations, and effects could be more easily contained than they will be "contained" within a future, highly "connected," globalized world. Hammes' consideration of the use of smallpox or engineered viruses suffers from such myopia. Furthermore, emerging technologies will be used by more people than merely Global Guerrillas or super-empowered nihilists, affecting the environment in which those groups must operate.

Tonight, while reviewing later portions of The Sling and The Stone mentioning 5GW, I detected another peculiar bias or oversight that I would add to these three, which perhaps explains these three. Near the very end of the book, when Hammes introduces his summary, he states,

Quote:

In designing our new personnel system and operational forces, flexibility must be a central tenet. Only a highly flexible organization can hope to succeed in 4GW and still be prepared to deal with emerging 5GW or variations on earlier forms of war.

The second sentence suggests an US (or, U.S.) that must confront 4GW forces and be ready to confront 5GW forces. While I agree with Hammes, I find only a limited understanding that we cannot look at the 4GW & 5GW models as merely representative of our foes or potential foes. I.e., Hammes argues that we have 4GW foes and may have 5GW foes; and he assumes these are the types of foes we must fight, but without also suggesting that we ourselves must become 4GW or 5GW fighters. At best, he says in the summary:

Quote:

[...]our primary step in preparing for 4GW warfare is to reform our personnel system to one that selects and grooms those who can function effectively in the free-flowing, networked environment characteristic of this type of war.

That is close to saying that the U.S. must form a 4GW force; however, given Hammes' excellent characterizations of 4GW opponents throughout the book, one must wonder if that's what he really meant. Okay, I know that he includes a chapter on "Where to from here?" in which he describes transitioning our military to a 4GW-styled force; but conveniently or unfortunately, Hammes has defined two types of 4GW: the opponent's style and our (suggested) version which he calls "netwar" in that chapter. Clearly, he is confused, as you can see when he says early in that chapter:

Quote:

Fourth-generation-warfare enemies do not see international boundaries as an impediment, nor do they see war as primarily a military function.

There, he has described one aspect of the Opponent's 4GW model of warfare; but he goes on within the chapter to described how DOD must change the U.S. military in order to fight these foes. One supposes that he did not feel comfortable suggesting within the book that we ourselves should ignore international boundaries and develop a force which also does not see war primarily as a military function. Not at all; rather, Hammes has attempted to style a different kind of 4GW for ourselves, calling it "netwar", which will not "break" the hierarchy of the U.S. military -- although it might loosen it up a bit. You can see the disjunction more clearly when Hammes continues to explain the different steps that must be taken: They are very good ideas, if considered loosely; but they can also be summarized as I've summarized the book in #1 above, Simply understanding and recognizing 4GW . Hammes gives steps that will ensure our forces understand and recognize 4GW and believes that those two things, when "netwar" is added to them, will be sufficient for ensuring victory. Again, we see in this the disjunction in his theory of 4GW, in which one style exists for our opponents and our own style consists of 1) "netwar" and 2) merely recognizing our opponents. God forbid that he should suggest we become our 4GW-opposite.

Rather, he suggests in the summary,

Quote:

If the United States can develop a proper force to fight fourth-generation war, that force is more likely than our current establishment to have the intellectual and physical flexibility to recognize and adapt to fifth-generation war as 5GW evolves.

The phrase, fight fourth-generation war, is ambiguous because, as I've outlined, it can mean that Hammes has a view of our opponents' 4GW and wants to fight it, or it can mean that we "fight [in the style of] 4GW." I believe it is the first. But worse, far worse, I'd bring in something both Arherring and PurpleSlog have mentioned in their recent entries:

Arherring wrote:

The problem I think is that we, as a society, are so used to being on the defensive, that we don't often enough ask how 5GW will be, and by necessity should be, used to defeat 4GW opponents. [from the post linked above]

PurpleSlog wrote:

The reason I am interested in 5GW is that 1) I am interest in the next next thing, and 2) I want to think about how to counter-4GW with something other then more 4GW. [from, "Introducing PurpleSlog"]

Arherring's characterization of our defensive thinking could be a pretty good summary of my recent criticism of Hammes here; but both point at something Hammes seems to have missed in his book and in the article Arherring linked: That we should not wait for 5GW to "emerge" or to be developed by our enemies. We should be developing it ourselves.